'Defend and extend': British business strategy, EU employment policy and the emerging politics of Brexit by Lavery, S.
This is an author produced version of 'Defend and extend': British business strategy, EU 
employment policy and the emerging politics of Brexit.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/123956/
Article:
Lavery, S. (2017) 'Defend and extend': British business strategy, EU employment policy 
and the emerging politics of Brexit. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
19 (4). pp. 696-714. ISSN 1369-1481 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117722713
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
For Review Only






	







	



	 	
		

 

	 
 !"	
#$%&$%''$$($)

*&



The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
For Review Only
1 
 
 
  
 ‘Defend and Extend’: British business strategy, EU employment policy and the emerging 
politics of Brexit  
 
Introduction   
Leading sections of British business strongly advocated a ‘Remain’ vote throughout the EU 
referendum campaign. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the CEOs of some of the UK’s 
largest firms and lobby groups based in the City all stressed the risk which ‘Brexit’ posed to 
investment, skills and competitiveness. The shock ‘leave’ vote in June 2016 therefore 
represented a major defeat for the ‘Remain’ campaign and for large swathes of British capital 
(Thompson, 2016: 114). In the immediate aftermath of the EU referendum, the situation from 
the perspective of British business seemingly deteriorated further. As sterling fell to a thirty 
year low, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, pivoted rhetorically towards an economic 
programme which was widely condemned as inimical to the ‘business interest’ (Sands, 2016).  
In this uncertain context, one of the key questions for analysts of British politics is how 
British business might attempt to regain control of the domestic agenda and thereby shape the 
Brexit process in line with its perceived interests. However, two obstacles stand in the way of 
‘mapping’ how British business might seek to achieve its objectives during the course of the 
Brexit negotiations and beyond. First, the politics of Brexit is a ‘moving target’ which is highly 
complex, evolving rapidly and embodies a wide array of competing social and political forces. 
Second – and more worryingly - the existing literature is ill-equipped to interrogate the 
emerging relationship between British business strategy and Brexit. This is because the British 
politics and, more surprisingly, British political economy literatures have tended to neglect the 
question of business power and strategy within the UK. As such, no comprehensive study of the 
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relation between business strategy, British politics and European integration has been 
conducted.  
This paper advances a distinctive account of British business strategy in relation to the 
EU in the period before the June 2016 referendum. The paper is organised around two core 
questions. First, in what ways has British business attempted to secure its objectives in the past 
within the EU? Second, how might Brexit problematise this strategic orientation? In order to 
answer these questions, the paper focuses primarily on British business strategy in relation to 
EU social and employment policy (EU S&EP). Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, British 
business interest groups have argued that the growth of EU S&EP threatens their freedom to 
control labour costs (Towers, 1992:  85). Focussing on British business attempts to minimise 
the impact of EU S&EP therefore provides us with a useful lens through which to identify British 
business strategy in relation to European integration. Through a documentary analysis of 
business submissions to the Balance of Competences review (a 2013 consultation led by the 
Coalition government on UK-EU relations) and of policy and strategy documents from the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) between 2010 and 2016, the paper argues that British 
business has attempted to ‘defend’ the UK’s labour market regime from EU S&EP through 
deploying the formal and informal power of the British state inside the EU institutions.  
This synthesis of British business and state power is in evidence beyond the field of EU 
S&EP. As evidenced below, in relation to the Capital Markets Union (CMU) agenda, British 
business also sought to utilise the power of British policymakers inside the EU in order to 
advance their interests and to ‘extend’ liberalisation outwards.  British business interest groups 
have therefore historically attempted to ‘defend and extend’ a liberalising agenda through 
deploying the formal and informal power of British policymakers inside the EU institutions. The 
ability to influence the rules of the Single Market has been as important to British business 
interest groups as access to the Single Market.  This analysis is suggestive of a series of 
dilemmas which now face British business interests as the UK embarks upon the Brexit process.  
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 The paper proceeds as follows. The first section argues that the issue of business agency 
has been neglected both empirically and conceptually in the British political economy literature. 
The second and third sections analyse the relation between business strategy and EU S&EP, 
analysing how business interest groups – and in particular the CBI – sought to deploy the power 
of the British state within the EU in order to ‘defend’ the UK’s flexible labour market from 
supranational upregulation. The fourth section extends the analysis and argues that the UK’s 
position as a powerful member state was also an important factor in the financial sector’s 
approach to the CMU agenda. The fifth section outlines how the ‘leave’ vote has problematised 
the ‘defend and extend’ strategy of British business, generating a series of dilemmas from the 
perspective of British capital. The final section concludes.   
‘Capital as Agency’: British Politics and Business Representation  
It is something of a truism that business is a powerful and privileged site of power 
within the advanced capitalist world (Crouch, 2004). Since the 1980s, capital has consistently 
increased its share of overall economic output relative to labour across Europe (Stockhammer, 
2016). Amidst this structural shift in favour of business, the UK’s liberal model of capitalism is 
commonly identified as a leading example of an economy which caters to the preferences of 
international capital. This is reflected in the UK’s comparatively low corporation tax regime, its 
openness to international capital flows, its limited employment protections and in its highly 
restrictive trade union laws. However, while the political economy literature acknowledges the 
structural bias of UK policy towards the preferences of internationally mobile capital, this same 
literature has tended to neglect the ways in which business itself embodies a crucial – if complex 
and often contradictory – site of agency within the UK and further afield.  
The absence of a theorisation of business agency can be seen throughout British politics 
and political economy scholarship. Across these literatures, there is a strong tendency to 
conceptualise the state as a site of contestation, contingency and discursive struggle whilst 
treating capital as an external factor which conditions the terrain within which politics takes 
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place. For example, whilst advocates of the ‘statecraft’ approach have argued that the Coalition 
government’s economic policy was driven primarily by electoral considerations (Gamble, 2014; 
Heppell & Seawright, 2012), this privileging of the ‘electoral’ sphere means that the question of 
how business power is organised and mobilised is not explicitly problematised. Similarly, whilst 
constructivist work has detailed how ‘ideas’ play an important role in shaping processes of 
social and political change within the UK and further afield (Baker & Underhill, 2015), these 
approaches overwhelming focus on ideational continuities and changes within formal 
policymaking institutions whilst neglecting the ways in which business attempts to organise 
itself as a collective political actor. Whilst the literature rightly points out that ‘external’ 
processes – such as ‘globalisation’ – can be constructed in a variety of different ways by state 
actors, the organisation of these ‘external’ forces themselves is rarely subjected to critical 
enquiry (see: Watson & Hay, 2003). This statist bias in the British political economy literature 
means that the question of business-government interactions in general and the question of 
corporate strategy in particular have been relatively neglected.1   
  Capital is not merely a ‘structural constraint’ on policymakers’ action. It is also in an 
important sense an agent capable of organising itself collectively and making strategic 
interventions into social and economic relations (Streeck, 2016). We can identify three 
modalities through which business can organise into a relatively coherent political force. First, 
firms can develop their own internal ‘political arms’, for example by funding ‘in house’ lobbying 
units, which can attempt to shape the regulatory climate in line with the firm’s perceived 
interests (Culpepper, 2015: 396). Informal connections between company directors or boards 
and government actors are another means through which individual firms can yield 
‘instrumental power’ over the legislative process (Block & Piven, 2010: 207). Second, business 
can seek to exert influence by utilising its ‘agenda setting’ power, for example through 
intervening within the media and by constructing its own corporate interest as congruent with 
the ‘general’ interest of society as a whole (Bell & Hindmoor, 2014; Macartney, 2008). Third, 
firms can organise into ‘business interest groups’ at the sectoral, regional, national or 
Page 4 of 31The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
5 
 
supranational levels. Within a specific economic sector, clusters of firms might form ‘trade 
associations’ which represent the interests of the branch of industry to which they belong 
(Grant, 1993: 4).2 Similarly, firms drawn from different sectors of the economy may become 
members of ‘employer associations’ which attempt to shape government policy in line with the 
preferences of the ‘business community’ (Grant, 1993). ‘Peak’ or ‘umbrella’ organisations such 
as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Directors (IOD) or more 
regionally-focussed business groups such as the Chambers of Commerce fall into this category. 
In what follows, it is this third form of organisation, that of business interest groups, which 
forms the core of the analysis of British business strategy in relation to EU S&EP policy.  
UK membership of the EU produced a series of threats and opportunities from the 
perspective of British business. The UK’s growth model has since the 1980s been underpinned 
by minimal employment protections relative to other advanced economies (Coates, 2001). As 
outlined below, the development of supranational EU S&EP after the Maastricht Treaty 
potentially threatened this comparative advantage. Simultaneously, the UK’s leading export 
sectors - in particular those concentrated in financial and business services - were also well-
positioned to benefit from the deepening of the Single Market. Two distinct objectives have 
therefore underpinned the strategic orientation of British business in relation to European 
integration since the 1990s: to defend the UK’s liberal labour market regime from supranational 
encroachment and to extend a liberalising bias outwards into the wider framework of European 
capitalism.  
In pursuit of these objectives, British business interest groups have deployed a number 
of strategies, including directly lobbying the Commission and exerting influence through the 
‘umbrella’ business association Business Europe (Greenwood, 2011: 69). This article focuses on 
a narrower but equally important dimension of British business strategy: the ways in which 
British business interest groups have sought to deploy the formal and informal power of UK 
policymakers inside the EU in order to advance a liberalising agenda. By ‘formal’ power, I refer 
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to the capacity of UK policymakers within EU institutions such as the Council and the European 
Parliament to directly shape the legislative process through formal channels, either by voting or 
by building liberalising alliances with other member states. By ‘informal’ power I refer to the 
ability of UK officials to indirectly shape the policy process, for example through acting as 
rapporteurs or committee chairs inside the EU institutions. As outlined in the empirical material 
below, the capacity of UK policymakers to exercise these forms of power inside the EU 
institutions has been a central component of British business attempts to ‘defend and extend’ a 
liberalisation agenda within the EU. Influence over well as ‘access’ to the Single Market has been 
a key feature of British business strategy in relation to European integration. However, Brexit 
undermines this orientation, raising important questions about the relation between British 
business strategy and European integration in the future.  
Throughout this article ‘British’ business refers to firms that are either headquartered 
within or have substantial operations within the UK. Of course, many British-based businesses – 
such as large banks in the City of London and export-oriented production hubs in the 
automotive and pharmaceutical sectors – are highly internationalised entities. However, the 
national ‘embeddedness’ of trans-nationalised entities is of analytical significance for two 
reasons. First, the UK has a distinct national regulatory regime which draws in particular forms 
of capital. For example, the UK’s common law system is amenable to financial services and 
shapes the strategic orientation of internationalised firms in relation to the British state 
important ways (Palan, 2015; Pistor, 2013). Second, the political proximity between powerful 
economic sectors and the UK government is well established. For example, the ‘City-Bank-
Treasury nexus’ embodies a combination of public and private power which is specific to the 
UK’s institutional and political context (Ingham, 1984). With these qualifications in mind, we 
can now turn to the relation between British business strategy, EU employment policy and the 
emerging politics of Brexit.  
British Business and EU Social and Employment Policy 
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Since the relaunch of European integration in the 1980s, political groupings within the 
EU have argued that the development of the Single Market should be complemented by the 
cultivation of a ‘social dimension’ to EU legislation (Bailey, 2008). The need to enhance EU social 
and employment policy (EU S&EP) is typically justified on the grounds that a minimum floor of 
supranational employment standards is necessary to prevent ‘social dumping’ and competitive 
deregulation between member states (Cremers, et al., 2007:  525). The prospect of developing 
extensive EU S&EP was ostensibly boosted under the Delors Commission, which extended EU 
competence over employment and industrial relations policy and introduced qualified majority 
voting across a broad range of social policy areas (Forde & Slater, 2016: 594). As a result, a 
range of EU employment directives and regulations – since the Amsterdam Treaty embodied in 
Articles 151 - 161 of the TFEU3 – attest to the emergence of a distinctive, albeit relatively weak, 
body of supranational social policy which seeks to establish a ‘minimum floor’ of labour 
protections across the EU. 
The scope and effectiveness of EU S&EP should not be overstated. Despite the professed 
ambitions of European social democrats, profound institutional and political barriers prevent 
the emergence of a fully-fledged ‘Social Europe’ (Scharpf, 2010). ‘Negative’ (market) as opposed 
to ‘positive’ (social) integration has been the predominant form of EU development both before 
and after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The predominance of negative integration has in 
turn created a range of pressures on the welfare systems of ‘coordinated market economies’ 
whilst leaving ‘liberal market economies’ relatively intact (Scharpf, 2010). Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to conclude that the limited development of the EU’s ‘social dimension’ has had 
no impact on the EU’s ‘liberal market economies’. In the case of the UK, since the New Labour 
government opted-in to the ‘Social Chapter’, EU directives have had a significant impact on the 
form and content of UK industrial relations and employment law (Hyman, 2008). EU legislation 
covering working time, holiday pay, parental leave, workplace consultation rights, agency 
workers and acquired rights have all been transposed into UK legislation and have acted as a 
European ‘floor’ on UK employment rights.  
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 During the Maastricht negotiations, British business groups including the CBI and the 
Institute of Directors (IOD) actively lobbied for an ‘opt-out’ from the Social Chapter (Lourie, 
1997). Speaking at the IOD in 1996, John Major stated to widespread applause that, “the Social 
Chapter should be seen for what it is - a European jobs tax, a tax on jobs by the front door and in 
time a tax on jobs by the back door… [it] would cost jobs and not create them…our enterprise 
economy is not negotiable, our economic success is too valuable to be wrecked by socialist 
experiments” (Major, 1996). British business interest groups’ first line of defence against EU 
S&EP was therefore to rely upon the formal power of UK policymakers to insulate the UK’s 
labour market regime through securing derogations from the emerging body of supranational 
employment law. When New Labour announced it would ‘opt-in’ to the EU’s Social Chapter by 
1998, leading employer organisations joined the Conservatives in opposition to this proposal. 
The CBI, for example, staunchly opposed the ‘opt-in’ on the grounds that it would increase the 
bureaucratic burden on British businesses and would result in legislation ill-suited to the UK’s 
economic model (Falkner, 1996:  10).  Ian Lang, President of the Board of Trade, claimed at the 
time that the ‘overwhelming view’ of industry was “that acceptance of the social chapter would 
seriously damage competitiveness and employment because it would allow the United Kingdom 
to be out-voted on measures imposing unnecessary burdens and costs on businesses” (cited in 
Lourie, 1997:  19).  
In the event, business was unsuccessful in opposing the incorporation of the Social 
Chapter into UK law. As such, a primary concern for British employer organisations in relation 
to the EU since 1998 has been how to ‘defend’ the UK’s flexible labour market regime by limiting 
the scope and domestic impact of supranational legislation. The content of EU S&EP has of 
course evolved considerably since 1998 and British business strategy has evolved along with it. 
The following section therefore focuses specifically on the period between 2010 and 2016 and 
identifies (i) areas of EU S&EP which British business groups have identified as particularly 
egregious and (b) the broad strategy which British business has adopted in order to limit the 
domestic impact of this legislation. 
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In order to establish an indicative account of British business strategy in this field, a 
document analysis of the Coalition government’s ‘Balance of Competences’ (BOC) review was 
conducted (FCO, 2014).4 One specific arm of the review focussed on EU ‘Social and Employment 
Policy’ and brought together submissions of evidence from a range of social actors, including 
trade unions, parliamentarians, business lobby groups, legal practitioners and NGOs (HM 
Government, 2014:  74). Business was well-represented in this section of the review, with 
submissions of evidence from the IOD, CBI, EEF manufacturers association and the Federation 
of Small Businesses (FSB) amongst a range of other employer organisations. In what follows, 
these submissions were analysed in order to establish some of the common concerns of British 
business in relation to the scope, content and implementation of EU S&EP in the period prior to 
the EU referendum.  
We can identify three broad areas of common business concern in the documents. First, 
there was strong tendency – identified across all the submissions of evidence reviewed – to 
suggest that EU S&EP has too often over-stepped the ‘minimalist’ threshold favoured by 
business. The employer organisations which were studied broadly acknowledge – at least on 
paper – the legitimacy of some degree of ‘proportionate legislation’ in the field of EU S&EP (CBI, 
2013a; EEF, 2013:  2). For example, EEF, the manufacturers association, wrote that a “baseline 
of labour market regulation which prevents businesses from competing unfairly against each 
other” is necessary at the EU level (EEF, 2013: 2). However, the reviewed submissions were 
consistent in arguing that these common EU labour standards should be kept as minimalist as 
possible. The EEF submission goes on to warn that, “Europe’s businesses are competing with 
other global businesses which do not have the costs and associated administrative burdens 
imposed in Europe”, suggesting that restraining regulatory costs should be a top EU priority. 
More forcefully, the IOD questions the overall value of EU S&EP, claiming that attempts to 
impose minimum labour standards across the EU undermines competitiveness and drives 
employers to seek atypical labour from outside the EEA (IOD, 2013a:  3). The CBI in its 
submission similarly advocates cutting back on the costs of EU S&EP, claiming that 54 per cent 
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of its members consider continued EU activism in this area to represent a “threat to UK labour 
market competitiveness” (CBI, 2013a: 3). The prevailing consensus in the documents, then, is 
that some degree of EU S&EP is in principle permissible but that the ‘reach’ of this legislation 
should be strongly curtailed.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE]  
Second, the employer organisations consistently identified a relatively narrow but 
specific set of EU directives and regulations which they considered to be unduly burdensome 
and in need of reform. Figure 1 outlines the number of mentions accorded to different EU 
directives and regulations within the reviewed submissions. In each case, the graph charts 
whether the EU directive is referred to ‘positively’ (i.e. that it is viewed as a ‘good thing’ for 
business which should be maintained or extended), ‘negatively’ (i.e. that it is viewed as 
burdensome on business and in need of reform, either at the EU or UK levels) or that it is 
viewed in a ‘neutral’ light. As the graph indicates, very few EU S&EP directives are viewed 
‘positively’ by the British business groups surveyed. Two areas of EU S&EP are regularly 
highlighted as having a ‘negative’ impact on business: the ‘Working Time Directive’ (WTD) and 
the ‘Agency Worker Directive’ (AWD). These directives are commonly identified as creating 
large ‘compliance costs’ on employer organisations (Coulter & Hancké, 2016). For example, the 
IOD and FSB bemoan the WTD’s requirement that ‘annual leave’ can be accrued during periods 
of absence (FSB, 2014:  6; IOD, 2013a:  4), whilst the British Hospitality Association highlighted 
the costs to small businesses of complying with the UK’s ‘opt-out’ from the 48 hour working 
week (BHA, 2013:  1). The threat of the UK losing its opt-out from the WTD is also frequently 
cited as a common concern amongst the business groups surveyed (BHA, 2013:  1; CBI, 2013a:  
3; IOD, 2013a:  14; LCCI, 2013:  5). A shared range of concerns can also be identified with 
respect to the AWD (HM Government, 2014:  39).  
A third area of commonality relates to the broad strategic orientation of the employer 
organisations which were studied. For instance, none of the employer organisations cited 
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advocated either that the UK should leave the EU or that employment policy should be 
‘repatriated’ to the UK (EEF, 2013:  16).5 Furthermore, the business groups surveyed advocate a 
similar range of broad objectives, including the need to secure ‘better’ – in other words more 
limited – EU regulation, to limit ‘gold plating’ and for the EU institutions to apply the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ more consistently (HM Government, 2014). A further concern amongst the 
employer organisations was the threat of EU actors and institutions extending their competence 
over employment policy too far in the future and thereby threatening the UK’s flexible labour 
market regime. For example, a number of the employer organisations voiced concerns around 
the UK’s ‘opt-out’ from the WTD’s 48 hour working week provision being repealed (HM 
Government, 2014). Similarly, a number of British businesses voiced concerns around the 
possible repeal of the AWD’s ‘Swedish derogation’ which allows client firms to avoid paying 
agency workers a wage equivalent to permanently employed staff so long as the agency worker 
in question is employed on a ‘permanent’ basis with an agency firm on a ‘pay between 
assignments’ model (Forde & Slater, 2016). 
The CBI, business strategy and EU Employment Policy (2010 – 2016)   
Rather than detailing the nuances of each business interest groups’ stated priorities in 
the BOC review, it is instructive to focus on one ‘peak’ organisation as representative of British 
business strategy in the field of EU S&EP. In this regard, focussing on the strategic positioning of 
the CBI and its approach to EU S&EP is instructive. First, the CBI is the UK’s largest ‘peak’ 
employers’ organisation, representing 190,000 companies which together employ one third of 
the private sector workforce (CBI, 2015:  1; Mcrae, 2005:  14). Second, at various moments the 
CBI has assumed a key role either in shaping UK government policy directly in relation to the EU 
or formally in facilitating the transposition of EU legislation into UK law (Jensen & Snaith, 2016: 
1304). For example, the CBI assumed the position of a ‘social partner’ in the agreements 
necessary to drive through the AWD in UK (Forde & Slater, 2016) and also shaped the Blair 
government’s position on the Working Time Directive (WTD) (Deakin & Wilkinson 2005: 340). 
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Third, as recent qualitative research has shown, the CBI’s proximity to the Conservative Party 
and the Cameron government in the run-up to the EU referendum underline its position as a key 
site of business organisation and mobilisation in relation to the EU (Jensen & Snaith, 2016). 
Analysing the CBI’s strategic positioning therefore provides us with a useful lens through which 
to interrogate the relation between British business strategy and EU S&EP in the period prior to 
the EU referendum. For the research, all publicly available policy documents released by the CBI 
between 2010 and 2016 were reviewed, with a specific emphasis on the CBI’s approach to EU 
S&EP.    
Three areas of concern are consistently highlighted throughout the documents. The 
CBI’s first ‘line of defence’ against EU S&EP is to challenge ‘gold-plating’ by the UK government 
(CBI, 2013b:  20). ‘Gold-plating’ refers to a situation whereby EU legislation is transposed into 
UK law in a non-minimalist manner, such that the provisions of the domestic regulations go 
over and above the minimum requirements of EU law (CBI, 2013; IOD, 2013; see also: HM 
Government, 2014). The CBI highlighted the AWD – which aimed to secure equal pay and 
conditions for agency workers with permanent employees working in an equivalent role6 – as 
one area which had a ‘damaging impact’, in part because the UK government had ‘gold plated’ 
EU legislation (CBI, 2011). The CBI’s analysis accords with that of the IOD, which in a separate 
study argued that the UK government had adopted an overly-expansive definition of ‘equal pay’ 
within the transposed legislation (IOD, 2013b:  11).7 British business groups therefore appealed 
in the first instance to the UK government’s formal power to implement EU labour market rules 
in as minimalist a fashion as possible.   
Second, the CBI regularly criticised what it terms ‘one size fits all’ policies emanating 
from the Commission which it claimed are ill-suited to the needs of the UK’s flexible labour 
market (CBI, 2015a:  3, 2016b:  4). As the CBI stated in its response to a Treasury enquiry, 49 
per cent of its members stated that over-bearing EU regulations had a negative impact on their 
business (CBI, 2016: 73). The AWD again represents a source of consternation in this regard. 
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For example, in Our Global Future, the CBI argued that the objective of the directive was 
misplaced in the UK context, since agency workers already received 92 per cent of equivalent 
employees’ wages and because no ‘unreasonable’ restrictions on agency work existed in the UK 
(CBI, 2013b:  73). As such, it argued that the AWD is an unnecessary piece of legislation which 
costs UK businesses £1.9 billion a year in compliance costs (ibid).  
Third, the CBI regularly highlights the threat of ‘mission creep’, whereby EU institutions 
overstep their ‘legitimate’ areas of competence and regulate in “areas that are best left to 
national governments”  (CBI, 2015a:  2). It cites the WTD as one area in which EU S&EP had 
legislated too extensively and, as we shall see below, regularly highlighted the threat to business 
if the UK lost its ‘opt-out’ as the result of activism within the European Parliament and European 
trade unions. 
An underlying tension for the CBI can be identified within the documents. Since 
Cameron’s ‘Bloomberg Speech’ in 2013, the UK’s position within the EU came under increasing 
threat (Menon, et al., 2016:  175). Throughout this period, the CBI was consistent in its support 
for continued EU membership, citing the benefits to British business of having unqualified 
access to the single market, free movement and investment flows associated with the EU (CBI, 
2013b). At the same time, one of its clear concerns was to ‘defend’ the UK’s flexible labour 
market regime from unsolicited encroachment by the EU institutions, not least because of 
serious concerns about EU competence in the field of employment law within the ranks of its 
own membership (CBI, 2013a:  1). The CBI therefore had to balance its support for the EU with 
mounting a defence of the UK’s ‘competitive’ labour market regime vis-à-vis EU S&EP. This 
conditioned the CBI’s strategic orientation in a number of ways. For example, whilst some pro-
business groups advocated ‘repatriating’ social and employment policy to the UK, the CBI 
warned that this was ‘unrealistic’ and could even lead to the ‘exit door’ (CBI, 2013b:  163). With 
its hands tied, the principal means by which the CBI sought to ‘defend’ the UK’s labour market 
was not through ‘repatriation’ or through ‘exit’ but by attempting to delimit and shape EU 
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legislation at source; that is by intervening in the EU’s legislative process itself. The CBI was 
thereby driven to ‘upscale’ its business strategy to the supranational level in order to defend the 
domestic interests of its membership.8  
This ‘upscaling’ of British business strategy involved two core elements. On the one 
hand – as predicted by neo-functionalist scholars of the EU – the CBI, along with other business 
lobby groups, sought to extend its influence ‘upwards’ in order to shape EU S&EP through 
supranational engagement (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997). In this regard, its membership of the 
European-level lobby group ‘Business Europe’ and increasing engagement with the Commission, 
European Parliament and other EU institutions have all formed core components of the CBI’s 
engagement strategy. The rise of corporate lobbying at the EU level has been widely charted and 
does not form the object of analysis here. Rather, a second – equally crucial – dimension of the 
CBI’s EU strategy should be noted. This is embodied in its attempt to deploy the formal and the 
informal power of the British state within the EU in order to secure the interest of British 
business in the field of EU S&EP.    
  The importance which the CBI attached to the role played by the British state within 
the EU institutions is clearly evident throughout the reviewed documents. In its consultation 
with the Treasury Committee, for example, the CBI stated that the UK had, “a powerful voice at 
the table, enabling us to have influence over the rules that business has to comply with and to 
achieve the reform of the European Union that the UK wants to see” (CBI, 2016c). It continues, 
“by being round the table in EU institutions, the UK can help to shape the EU legislative agenda 
and ensure the Commission regulates only where necessary” (CBI, 2016c). UK membership of 
the EU was therefore not simply preferable because it provided business with ‘access’ to the 
Single Market; the capacity of the UK to shape EU legislation through mobilising its formal 
power as a member state was of equal salience to the CBI’s European strategy.  
The CBI identified the ‘formal’ voting power of the UK within the EU parliament and 
Council as crucial to its European engagement strategy. In particular, the CBI emphasised the 
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UK’s ability to build alliances with other member states in order to limit the supranational 
upregulation of labour standards. For example, it drew attention to Britain’s status as the ‘best 
country at building alliances’ in the 2000s and its ability to secure the support of Germany and 
other member states in limiting the ‘anti-competitive’ impact of the pregnant workers directive 
and other labour regulations (CBI, 2016b). In its report Choosing Our Future, the CBI stated that, 
“the UK is not alone in wanting reform and by working with our European partners... we have 
the opportunity, right now, to achieve reform for a more outward looking, open and competitive 
European Union” (CBI, 2015b). 
In the field of EU S&EP, there is evidence that the CBI sought to shape UK policymakers’ 
preferences in order to secure reforms which would be to the (perceived) benefit of British 
business. For example, in the run-up to Cameron’s ‘renegotiation’ of the UK’s membership in 
February 2016, the CBI pushed hard for a ‘moratorium’ on EU S&EP that ‘stifles the EU’s 
competiveness’ (CBI, 2016a:  10). It also consistently pressurised the British government to 
make the UK’s WTD ‘opt-out’ permanent (CBI, 2013b:  171; Gordon, 2015). Central to realising 
the CBI’s objectives, then, was its ability to shape UK policymakers’ orientation within the EU 
and to make use of the UK’s position as a powerful member state in order to further the British 
business agenda.  
As well as seeking to deploy the formal power of UK policymakers within the EU, the 
documents also reveal that the CBI was highly attentive to the ways in which UK policymakers 
could yield informal influence over EU legislation in order to shape EU S&EP in line with the 
interests of British business. For example, it states that, “the UK also has notable informal 
influence in the EU legislative process and has, for example, leveraged its ability to build 
alliances and use British expertise to help shape the agenda” (CBI, 2016c). At various points, the 
CBI explicitly argues that informal influence of this form should be strengthened. For example, 
in its submission to the Treasury Committee, the CBI (2016b: 14) argues that:  
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The potential for influence in the European Parliament is considerable when 
considering the power Committee chairs and rapporteurs have over the text of 
legislation. British MEPs must step up engagement in the law making process and 
represent the interests of British business. To boost UK informal influence in the EU, the 
UK must do more to ensure it has personnel in key positions to help frame the debate. 
The UK has 10% of senior management and top cabinet positions in the European 
Commission (the second highest), but is underrepresented in staffing across the 
European Parliament and European Commission generally. Despite making up 12.5% of 
the EU population, in 2013 UK nationals represented only 4.6% of EU Commission staff, 
5.8% of staff in the EU parliament and 4.3% in the Council of the EU. 
(CBI, 2016b:   14) 
As the above evidence suggests, ‘access’ to the economic benefits of the Single Market 
was not the CBI’s only consideration. Ensuring that UK policymakers enjoyed formal and 
informal influence over the shape of EU legislation was also a key concern. We can therefore 
identify, at the core of the CBI’s European strategy, a key underlying objective: to deploy the 
formal and informal power of the British state within the EU institutions in order to ‘defend’ the 
UK’s flexible labour market regime and to thereby further advance a liberalising agenda. 
 
Business strategy and Capital Markets Union (CMU)  
 EU S&EP of course represent only one policy field which British business sought to 
shape in line with its liberalising agenda. British business interest groups’ concern to ‘defend’ 
the UK’s flexible labour market regime was paralleled by a second objective: to extend 
liberalisation outwards by opening-up the Single Market to the UK’s large export-oriented 
financial and business services sectors. As was the case with EU S&EP, the UK’s position as a 
powerful EU member state was central to business strategy in this regard. An indicative 
summary of recent developments around ‘Capital Markets Union’ (CMU) serve to illustrate this 
point (Quaglia et al., 2016).9 CMU, launched in 2014 by the Juncker Commission, sought to 
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address the concern that many European firms finance their loans excessively through ‘bank-
based’ lending. CMU aimed to develop ‘alternative’ forms of finance, such as equity markets, 
peer-to-peer lending and hedge funds, with the stated objective of increasing the supply of 
credit to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (European Commission, 2015). Since 85 
per cent of the EU’s hedge funds and 42 per cent of its private equity are based within the City of 
London, CMU represented a unique opportunity for the UK’s financial sector (Quaglia, 2016b: 7).  
UK policymakers and City firms played a pro-active role in shaping the development of 
CMU in its early stages. After an extensive consultation exercise involving key players from the 
UK’s financial sector, Treasury officials and senior Commission staff, the House of Lords 
described the development of CMU as a “fillip to the UK economy and the City of London in 
particular” (House of Lords, 2015:  32). The report stated that, “the UK must ensure that it is at 
the forefront of the debate as the CMU agenda takes shape in the coming months. It will not 
suffice simply to react to others’ proposals: the City and the Government should be active in 
responding to the Commission’s initiative” (ibid: 32). In the early stages of CMU, the UK 
government therefore became a ‘pace-setter’ on CMU at the EU level (Quaglia, 2016a). City firms 
and lobby groups worked closely in collaboration with the UK government in pushing through 
the agenda (CBI, 2015c; CityUK, 2015). For example, a quarter of responses to the Commission’s 
2015 CMU consultation were from UK-based financial firms whilst the then-Commissioner for 
CMU – UK national Jonathan Hill - convened regularly with the City on the topic (European 
Commission, 2017; Quaglia, 2016b). City-based firms stepped up their engagement with formal 
policymaking EU institutions such as the Commission, whilst the UK government was adopted a 
proactive approach to shaping the CMU agenda from inside the EU institutions.  
 Two contending visions of CMU had been advanced in its early stages. The first, 
supported by federalists and some Eurozone states, claimed that capital markets required 
deeper integration and the formation of pan-European regulatory mechanisms. The 2015 Five 
Presidents Report, for example, explicitly stated that the development of the CMU, “should lead 
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ultimately to a single European capital markets supervisor” (The European Commission, 2015). 
In contrast, the UK government and British business groups were hostile to the idea that 
deepened capital markets required enhanced supranational regulation. For example, Charles 
Roxburgh, director-general of financial services at the Treasury, stated that attempts to create a 
pan-European supervisory body were neither “necessary or desirable” and would prove to be a 
“huge distraction” (House of Lords, 2015:   44). Similarly, a CBI report counselled against the EU 
assuming an enhanced legislative role in relation to CMU, arguing for key regulatory 
competences to remain at the member state level (CBI, 2015c: 3). The perception that the UK 
was in the ‘driving seat’ of the CMU meant it was viewed as a ‘roadblock’ and ‘brake’ on further 
integration with respect to CMU by senior EU officials (Brunsden & Barker, 2016). CMU 
therefore embodied a policy sphere in which public and private business actors within the UK 
could ‘extend’ their preferences for liberalisation and subsidiarity outwards into the wider 
framework of EU capitalism.    
The emerging politics of Brexit and business strategy  
The UK’s position as a powerful member state has been a crucial element of business 
attempts to ‘defend and extend’ a liberalising agenda in the EU. Continued ‘access’ to the single 
market was of course central to business support for the UK membership prior to and 
throughout the referendum; but the capacity to shape EU legislation was also a crucial strategic 
consideration. In the aftermath of the vote to ‘leave’ these channels of influence have been 
fatally compromised. Brexit therefore generates a series of dilemmas from the perspective of 
British capital. Policy documents released by the CBI since the referendum state that the group’s 
‘top priority’ is to achieve a ‘barrier free relationship’ with the Single Market (CBI, 2016c:  4). In 
pursuit of this objective, the CBI advocates ‘regulatory harmonisation’ with the EU in order to 
ensure that non-tariff barriers are kept to a minimum (CBI, 2016c:  18). However, the existing 
models which guarantee this relationship – for example Norway’s membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) – require not only product market harmonisation but also compliance 
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with EU S&EP. In this situation, the UK would have to comply with EU S&EP whilst being unable 
to ‘defend’ the UK’s flexible labour market regime in the ways it has done in the past. 
Interestingly, this prospect has been anticipated by the CBI. It’s report A Whole Economy View of 
Brexit states that, “business and government must work together to agree how to secure long-
term regulatory cooperation between the EU and UK markets after the UK leaves … [however] it 
is not in the UK’s interests to be a rule taker. In areas such as social and employment regulation 
in particular, it would not be acceptable for the UK to implement laws over which is has had no 
say” (CBI, 2016c: 18).  
In the aftermath of May’s ‘hard’ Brexit Lancaster House speech in January 2017, it is 
highly unlikely – if not inconceivable – that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) will continue to 
have jurisdiction over the UK in the aftermath of the Article 50 process. Nonetheless, the CBI’s 
post-Brexit positioning is indicative of an important dilemma for British business; namely, how 
to minimise non-tariff barriers with the remaining 27 member states whilst at the same time 
insulating business from unsolicited regulatory incursions by the EU. This basic dilemma is 
likely to continue to shape British business strategy as the politics of Brexit unfolds. Indeed, as 
the CBI puts it in its post-referendum strategy document Shaping Our Future, “UK policymakers 
must continue to engage on the EU legislative agenda. A long-term strategy for influencing new 
EU rules and standards that may still apply to UK businesses after exit will have to be 
established” (CBI, 2016d:   6).      
  Fear of becoming a ‘rule taker’ in the aftermath of Brexit is also evident within the UK’s 
financial sector. A January 2017 report from the International Regulatory Strategy Group, a 
research and lobbying organisation funded by the City of London Corporation and the City UK, 
underlines this point (IRSG, 2017a). The IRSG report assesses whether ‘third country regimes’ 
(TCRs) – regulatory arrangements which grant non-EU financial firms limited and conditional 
access to the single market – would be an acceptable arrangement for the City. The report 
answers unequivocally in the negative. In particular, for ‘third countries’ to maintain access to 
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the single market, the non-EU government subject to the TCR must constantly update their 
domestic regulations so as to comply with changes in EU law. As the report warns, “the UK may 
end up being something of a ‘rule-taker’ – having to implement changes in its own law to follow 
changes in EU law (and having less ability to influence those changes than it did as a member of 
the EU)” (IRSG, 2017: 7). Regulatory ‘equivalence’ regimes are therefore viewed as a threat to 
the City not merely because they provide less extensive access but because they also entail 
compliance with rules over which the UK would have less control. Rather than endorsing TCR as 
an alternative model for the City, the IRSG advocates a ‘bespoke’ agreement between the UK and 
the EU which allows for ‘mutual rights of access’ (IRSG, 2017: 24). As part of this package, the 
ISRG advocates the creation of an ‘independent tribunal’ – equivalent to the EFTA Court within 
the EEA – which would ensure that ‘mutual access’ was guaranteed in line with ‘robust 
processes and procedures’ (IRSG, 2017: 25). Placing the political and practical feasibility of 
these proposals to one side, the intent behind the strategy is clear: to ‘lock in’ existing levels of 
access for the City and to limit the competence of the EU to legislate with prejudice against the 
UK’s financial sector in the future. The underlying objective – to ‘defend’ the City from 
unsolicited supranational regulatory incursion – endures, but the legal and institutional means 
to achieve this objective have altered.  
Conclusion   
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, British business has sought to ‘defend and 
extend’ a liberalising agenda within the EU. A crucial component of this strategy was to deploy 
the formal and informal power of UK policymakers inside the EU institutions in order to secure 
pro-business reforms. As the analysis of the BOC review of EU S&EP has demonstrated, although 
British business putatively accepted a ‘baseline’ of EU labour market regulation, in practice it 
criticised the high compliance costs associated with various EU employment directives and has 
sought to limit the scope of EU S&EP in a number of different ways. The UK’s erstwhile position 
as a powerful member state - and its capacity to build alliances with a broader liberal bloc inside 
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the EU - has been a central component of CBI attempts to ‘defend’ the UK’s labour market 
regime from supranational encroachment. UK membership of the EU has also been central to a 
second component of British business strategy: to extend liberalisation outwards and to open-
up the Single Market to the UK’s competitive financial and business services sectors. As outlined 
in relation to the CMU programme, private and public actors based within the UK were ‘pace 
setters’ in the early stages of this agenda, collectively mobilising to deepen financial market 
integration and to widen the City’s ability to finance lending across member states (Quaglia, 
2016b). The question of influence over as well as access to the Single Market has therefore been 
a central component of British business attempts to ‘defend and extend’ a liberalisation agenda 
in the EU.  
Brexit fundamentally problematises this strategic orientation. This generates a series of 
dilemmas from the perspective of British capital.  On the one hand, both the CBI and City lobby 
groups have made clear that a degree of regulatory harmonisation between the UK and the EU 
will be necessary if a disruptive Brexit is to b  averted. However, this poses the threat that the 
UK could become a ‘rule taker’, subject to regulatory incursions over which British business and 
UK policymakers will no longer be able to exercise control. As the CBI put it in a post-Brexit 
publication, “balancing regulatory equivalence with the EU with flexibility and influence over 
the domestic environment” will be a central objective of British business going forward (CBI, 
2016e). Similar concerns have exercised representatives of the UK’s financial sector, who have 
advanced proposals to ‘lock in’ existing levels of access whilst retaining oversight mechanisms 
which would protect the City from the emergence of ‘protectionist’ EU legislation (IRSG, 2017a, 
2017b). The practicability of these proposals and the likelihood that they will secure assent 
from the EU institutions is of course open to question. But the logic which underpins these 
manoeuvres - to ‘defend’ the UK’s liberal labour market regime and capital markets from 
supranational incursion - represents a continuity with pre-Brexit business strategy, albeit in a 
markedly reconfigured institutional, legal and political context.  
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The question of British business strategy and its relation to the emerging politics of 
Brexit offers fertile ground for future research. The victory of the ‘Leave’ campaign – which so 
clearly ran against the stated interests of powerful sections of British capital – apparently 
challenges the thesis that business exerts ‘structural power’ over the modern capitalist state 
(Block, 1981; Lindblom, 1977).  However, recent updates of the ‘structural power’ thesis have 
emphasised the ways in which business can secure concessions from government by cultivating 
the perception that the pursuit of a certain policy will lead to disinvestment (Bell & Hindmoor, 
2014, 2015). Brexit may have represented a defeat for broad swathes of British capital. But 
heightened economic uncertainty also potentially empowers  well organised business interests 
to push their agendas and to ‘take back control’ of the domestic agenda. Charting these 
reconfigurations in business strategy and business power therefore represents a crucial task if 
we are to adequately analyse and respond to the emerging politics of the Brexit conjuncture.  
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1 Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a marked – albeit limited – increase in scholarly accounts 
of the ‘structural power’ of business. However, these accounts have tended to focus on the financial sector 
and the power of international banks in particular. Furthermore, the relation between business power 
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and EU integration remains under-studied. Although mainstream and critical variants of EU studies have 
focussed on the business-EU nexus, they have done so by privileging analytically the supranational scale. 
This means that the organisation and articulation of powerful business interests at the domestic scale and 
the ways in which these can condition EU integration has been neglected. 
2
 Within the UK, the EEF manufacturers association, financial sector lobby groups such as the British 
Bankers Association and agricultural groups such as the National Farmers Union fall into this category. 
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.   
4
 The BOC review was a large consultation exercise led by the Coalition government between 2012 and 
2013 which sought to gather evidence on the EU’s impact on the UK.  The review covered 32 policy areas 
and drew on over 2,300 submissions of evidence from a variety of stakeholders 
5 As was advocated by some pro-business voices at the time.  
6 This would be subject to a 12 week qualifying period in the UK.  
7 The AWD sought to establish ‘equal pay’ between temporary and permanent workers employed in 
similar roles within in an organisation. In the UK case, this was subject to a 12 week qualifying period. 
However, as the IOD argued in a subsequent publication that the UK government’s definition of ‘pay’ was 
overly-expansive, unnecessarily including bonus payments in its definition. 
8 This process of course was taking place long before the period studied here. Nonetheless, the CBI’s need 
to advocate a ‘reformed’ EU became increasingly salient after Cameron’s pledge to hold the EU 
referendum. 
9
 Capital Markets Union (CMU) of course represents only one policy area where UK political actors and 
businesses assumed a leading role in driving through EU financial market integration and liberalisation. 
Other examples include the Financial Services Action Plan (Mügge, 2006, p. 1013) as well as the 
Lamfalussy directives in solvency markets (Quaglia, 2016b, p. 4). CMU should therefore be understood as 
one amongst many policy areas where British policymakers and business played an important role as 
‘pace setters’ on deepening financial markets.  
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Source: Balance of Competences Review: Social and Employment Policy. Submissions from employer 
organisations and business associations.   
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
M
e
n
ti
o
n
s
 
Directive 
Figure 1: British Business Views: EU Social and
Employment Policy
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Page 31 of 31 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
